The Market and the Bomb
U.S. Nonproliferation Leverage on Major Nuclear Suppliers, 1974-1992
Project under development since September 2014
Historical evidence shows that despite extensive efforts adopted by the United States, its nonproliferation policy toward supplier states had been partially successful at best. Why was this the case? What types of U.S. policies had been more successful, and under what conditions? This project is an examination of U.S. efforts to convince major West European nuclear supplier states to enhance their export control regulations since the mid-1970s. Nuclear supplier states had commercial and strategic interests in providing nuclear assistance. These states also rarely accepted the U.S. definition of ‘proliferation risk’ and which materials and technologies to control because of that risk. This project studies nuclear assistance by France, West Germany, and Switzerland from 1974 until 1992 to threshold states like Pakistan, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, South Africa and others. Based on preliminary research findings, it argues that U.S. nonproliferation policy tended to be more successful toward supplier states when (a) government-industry relations in the supplier state were centralized, and (b) the United States offered inducements to the supplier state instead of coercing them. It is an investigation of the challenges and opportunities for U.S. power in the global atomic marketplace.
© Jayita Sarkar
RESULTS TO BE PUBLISHED IN:
Journal of Cold War Studies: Link